Karl Sigmund's work sits at the junction of math, biology and evolution.
He is a full professor in the University of Vienna's Mathematics department.
Former president of the Austrian Mathematical Society and full member of the Austrian Academy of Science.
His research interests include mathematical ecology, chemical kinetics and population genetics, but especially the new field of evolutionary game dynamics and replicator equations and the evolution of cooperation in biological and human populations.
For more information, please visit this website
Title: Sanctions and Public Goods
Punishment of free-riders is generally viewed as an important factor in promoting cooperation. But since it is often costly to sanction exploiters, the emergence of such a behavior and its stability raise interesting problems. Players who do not contribute to the sanctions, but profit from the increased level of cooperation caused by them, act as "second-order exploiters" and threaten the joint enterprise.
In this talk, we review the role of voluntary participation in establishing and upholding cooperation with or without punishment.
In particular, we deal with two distinct forms of punishment, namely peer punishment and pool punishment, and compare their stability and their efficiency. The emergence and upkeep of collaborative undertakings can strongly depend on whether participation is voluntary or mandatory. The possibility to opt out of a joint enterprise often helps in curbing exploiters and boosting pro-social behavior.
